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In various publications, Theo Engelen charted the decline of fertility in 
the Netherlands, which he described as a shift from ‘fate’ to ‘choice’ (En-
gelen, 2009). Gradually, people abandoned the old notion that children 
were a ‘gift from God’, and that their number could not and should not be 
limited. After 1880, the more modern notion of family size as a matter of 
choice became apparent in the rapid decline of marital fertility rates. How-
ever, there was a huge social and cultural variation in both the perception 
that fertility could be controlled and the desire to actually do so (Engelen, 
1987; Engelen & Hillebrand, 1986). Thus, the timing, speed and intensity 
of the transition towards smaller families depended both on religious be-
liefs and the economic benefits of children. This led to a large range of 
family sizes. For example, in the census of 1960 non-denominational 
white-collar workers reported 2.5 live-born children per marriage, whereas 
Roman Catholic farmers reported no less than 7.2 (Engelen 2009, p. 85). 
    Did people, in opting for a smaller family, take account of the sex com-
position of their family? In other words, did they stop having children ear-
lier once they had produced a desired set of sons and daughters? In many 
societies, sex preferences are related to fertility. A strong preference for 
sons can result in high fertility, in the absence of sex-specific abortion or 
infanticide (Oppenheimer, 2001; Seidl, 1995). In many cultures, even in 
those preferring sons, parents hope to have at least one child of each sex 
(Anderson, Hank & Vikat, 2006). This means that a preference for a 
‘mixed’ offspring set can also lead to higher fertility, when parents who 
only have children of one sex continue to have children.  
    In this chapter, I aim to study whether and how sex preferences affected 
the Dutch fertility decline. When parents desire a small family, they often 
also prefer to have a child of each sex. Old sayings refer to the wish of hav-
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ing one son and one daughter as ‘the royal wish’ (koningswens) or the ‘rich 
folks’ wish’ (rijkeluiswensch) (Stoett, 1923-25). In England, this ideal family 
composition is known as the ‘pigeon pair’. But how old is this preference? 
Can we find evidence for the desire for a mixed set of offspring, e.g. in 
continued childbearing after, say, two, three or four sons or daughters? 
Among American couples born in the early 1900s, progression to the third 
child was clearly determined by the sex composition (Raley & Bianchi, 
2006). In the German countryside, too, a preference for a mixed set of off-
spring was already visible among couples marrying between 1875 and 1900 
(Sandström & Vikström, 2015). Reher et al. (2017) found similar outcomes 
for Dutch couples after 1900, whereas in the period between roughly 1875 
and 1900 no clear preference was found.  
    But why would the sex of children matter at all? The literature suggests 
a shift in preferences accompanying socio-economic change. In societies 
where parents depended strongly on the economic contribution of their 
sons, even after their sons’ marriages as in many patrilineal societies, a 
strong preference for sons was found. Examples of this phenomenon are 
China and India. But in Europe as well, the preference for sons or 
daughters depended for a long time on their perceived benefits, which dif-
fered by sex. Daughters were welcomed for the social help they could give 
to ageing parents, and daughter preference appears to be related to the type 
of welfare regime (Gray & Evans, 2005). However, in recent stages of econ-
omic development, benefits of children came to be replaced by perceived 
(opportunity) costs, and in the ‘value’ of children psychological benefits 
came to play a larger role. Parents found and expressed their identity 
through children, and father-son and mother-daughter bonding formed 
an important element in psychological fulfillment (Hank & Kohler, 2000; 
Mills & Begall, 2010). This explains why in the shift towards small families 
– in itself part of the rise of individualism – sex preferences became 
stronger (Gray, 2004). However, even in contemporary Europe, sex pref-
erences are not ‘universal’ or similar. A survey of seventeen countries (the 
Netherlands not included) disclosed that in one-third of the countries the 
progression to the third child was not affected by a sex preference, while 
in the other countries, both a preference for a mixed set as well as a girl 
preference (in Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania) was found 
(Hank & Kohler, 2000). In countries with low gender equity, the preference 
for boys is still strong (Mills & Begall, 2010). Thus, sex preferences, al-
though undoubtedly embedded in traditional norms, can shift due to 
economic changes and the rise of welfare states, and due to the changing 
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value of children. The preferences also depend on parity – apparently they 
are particularly relevant in the progression to the third or the fourth child, 
as the motives regarding whether to have children at all dominate decisions 
surrounding lower parities (Bulatao, 1981). 
    Recently, Reher et al. (2017) analyzed the effect of sex composition of 
the family on parity progression, comparing Spain, Sweden and the Ne-
therlands. The outcomes of their analysis are very intriguing, since they 
suggest that in the Netherlands, in contrast to Spain and Sweden, no pref-
erence for male offspring existed before the fertility transition. In their 
study, they pooled all parities 3-8, which makes it difficult to distinguish 
between couples who wanted to control their family composition and 
those who did not. Moreover, they did not compare sex preferences in off-
spring across social groups or religious denominations, nor did they 
contrast cities and countryside. This contribution aims to add these per-
spectives. I hypothesize that, if a preference for a mixed set of children 
emerged, this happened in the same social groups which were also fore-
runners in limiting family size: (urban) elites and Liberal Protestants. 
    Detecting changing or emerging sex preferences for offspring in the 
Dutch past, differentiated by social and religious groups, requires high-
quality data. In the next section, we will discuss the data and the methods 
we applied for this research. Then we will take a look at parity progression 
rates by sex composition. Next, we will proceed to a comparison with the 
findings for the 19th-century German countryside, by using a similar ap-
proach focusing on the transition to the fifth child. Finally, we will try to 
find the forerunners of the mixed two-children family ideal. I emphasize 
the word ‘try’, as it will soon become apparent that sex preferences were 
largely absent before 1950. 
 
 
data and methods 
 
If we are to trace shifts in sex preference, e.g. from a preference for sons 
to a preference for mixed offspring, we require data covering a long period. 
Ideally, this data will include different contexts (urban and rural settings), 
different social groups (to account for the effect of household production), 
different religions, the age of the mother, and the survival status of the 
children. A dataset that matches these criteria is the Historical Sample of 
the Netherlands (Mandemakers, 2006). The sample of Research Persons 
is drawn (0.5%) from birth certificates (1812-1922). Research Persons born 
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after 1862 (in some regions from 1850 onward), are tracked in their entire 
life courses, including family formation, using the population registers. 
This implies that we have good information on fertility decisions after 
about 1890. This data has also been used by Reher et al. (2017), but we 
would like to cover an earlier period as well, since in some social groups 
fertility decline had already begun before 1880/1890. To discover sex pref-
erences before the onset of the fertility decline, we can also make use of 
the data on the family of orientation of the Research Persons. But this 
comes with some methodological caveats. As the sample is drawn from 
the birth certificates, children from large families have a greater likelihood 
of being selected than children from small families. Thus, although the 
children are representative of their generation, their parents are not. To 
demonstrate the effects of this ‘bias’, Figure 1 shows the distribution of 
completed families (i.e. the parents are observed at least until the mother 
reached age 45), differentiating between the family of orientation of Re-
search Persons and their own families. The latter information is derived 
from a database of Research Persons marrying in the inter-war period (be-
tween 1918 and 1939) (Van Bavel, Kok & Engelen, 2008). Only fertile 
couples are included in the analysis. The two ‘samples’ show a very differ-
ent picture. Whereas small families are a minority in the family of orien-
tation, even when the mother was born in the 1880s, they strongly 
dominated the families of the Research Persons themselves. Thus, the fer-
tility decisions of parents of Research Persons clearly cannot be taken as 
representative of Dutch couples in general. We do see some interesting 
trends, however. Due probably to declining mortality, we see a remarkable 
increase in the share of large families among (maternal) birth cohorts 1810-
1860. After birth cohort 1850/59, the share of small families increases. In 
the ‘own’ families, we witness a decline in the share of small families, which 
is probably due to the Baby Boom. 
 
In this chapter I use, with necessary caution, data from the parental 
families (building on Vermunt 2017, n = 36,974) and from the inter-war 
dataset (n = 3,099). Both datasets are harmonized and integrated. Apart 
from the surviving ‘sibset’ at each parity, I include variables on socio-econ-
omic status, religion and place of residence. Social groups are classified 
according to the hisclass codes of the occupations of the fathers (Van 
Leeuwen & Maas, 2011), religious denominations according to the scheme 
proposed by Kok (2017), and urban-rural localities according to the defi-
nitions by Kooij (1985).
494
jan kok
parity progression  
 
Although the data, as described above, do not form the best indicators of 
fertility levels, this should not affect a comparison of parity progression 
by family composition. My interest here is in whether stopping or con-
tinuing with having children depended on having a mixed-sex group of 
children, or having only boys or girls. And do I find differences already 
after two children, or particularly at higher parities as predicted in the lit-
erature? In Figures 2, 3 and 4, I show progression rates by birth period of 
the second, third and fourth (surviving) child, respectively. I only include 
those natal families in which the Research Person had already been born. 
    When there is a (growing) preference for mixed offspring sets, we 
should see this reflected in lower parity progression rates compared to sets 
consisting of only boys and only girls. Also, on average, couples with a 
strong son preference will continue to have children if they have only girls. 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 do not show a consistent sex preference. The rates for 
the progression from the second to the third parity (Figure 2) are remark-
ably similar, suggesting the absence of any preference. In Figure 3, it seems 
as if the relatively low progression rates for families with only boys in the 
1870s reverses between 1910 and 1930. Figure 4 is also difficult to interpret: 
495
Pigeon pairs and rich folks’  dreams
Figure 1 Distribution by family size (surviving children) of the family of 
orientation (parental family) and family of procreation (own family) of 
Research Persons of the Historical Sample of the Netherlands, by birth 
cohort of the mother/wife. 
overall progression rates for ‘only boys’ seem to be higher than for ‘only 
girls’, which might indicate that parents would rather have at least one girl 
than at least one boy.  
    My findings corroborate the outcomes of Reher et al. (2017) who found, 
after 1900, elevated hazard ratios of a next child of couples having only 
boys. However, we can see that this mattered for the progression to the 
fourth and fifth parity much more than to the third. These graphs may be 
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Figure 2. Parity progression by birth period of the second surviving child 
and by composition of the family (1850-1949).
Figure 3. Parity progression by birth period of the third surviving child and 
by composition of the family (1850-1949).
influenced by changes over time, for instance in the age at childbirth, and 
they may hide important variation, for instance by social group or the 
share of people living in cities. To tackle those problems, we need a multi-
variate approach. 
 
 
progression to the fifth child. a comparison  
with rural germany 
 
Knodel and De Vos (1980) did not find evidence for sex preferences in 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany, which puzzled them as they 
had expected at least a preference for sons. Recently, Sandström & Vik-
ström (2015) repeated their analysis, focusing on the progression from the 
fourth to the fifth child, a parity at which deliberate stopping was most 
common in the population studied by Knodel and De Vos (1980). How-
ever, Sandström and Vikström used event history analysis, which takes 
account not only of the event of the birth of a next child, but of its timing 
as well. Often, a failed attempt at stopping is visible in a long birth interval. 
Using this technique, they did find a clear son preference until (marriage 
cohort) 1875, changing into a preference for a mixed offspring after 1875. 
By emulating their method, and thus specifying Cox regression models 
in a similar way, my aim is to see whether a similar pattern can be found 
for the Netherlands as well. Admittedly, I have used birth cohorts of 
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Figure 4. Parity progression by birth period of the fourth surviving child 
and by composition of the family (1850-1949).
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children, whereas Sandström & Vikström make distinctions between mar-
riage cohorts of parents. 
    The method implied that all intervals were calculated between the 
fourth (surviving) child and the fifth. If no fifth child was born, but the 
family was still observed, the episode was ‘censored’ after six years. If the 
family was observed for a shorter period (e.g. through the death of the 
mother), censoring occurred earlier. To make the outcomes as comparable 
as possible, I tried to include similar controls for socio-economic status, 
area (in my case rural or urban) and the mother’s age. However, I also con-
trolled for religion. As Engelen (2009) has shown, religion was a crucial 
variable in fertility control, at least before 1960. 
    In table 1, the reference category is always a mixed offspring set. Each 
row represents a separate model, of which the control variables are not 
shown. The first rows show the outcomes (relative likelihoods) of Sand-
ström and Vikström. In the fourteen German villages originally explored 
by Knodel and colleagues, couples marrying between 1825 and 1849 only 
exhibited a boy preference: the relative chances of a next child were 22% 
higher when the couple had four surviving girls compared to when they 
had both boys and girls. When they had four surviving boys, however, 
they responded in the same way as parents of a ‘mixed’ set. In the marriage 
cohort 1850-1874, the boy preference even increased. However, couples 
marrying after 1875 also showed a desire to continue with childbearing 
when they had four girls. Sandström and Vikström (2015) see this as a 
clear indication of an emerging preference for a mixed set of children. 
    The Historical Sample of the Netherlands makes it possible to run simi-
lar models, but also to zoom in on regions and groups of interest. Thus, I 
run separate models for town, countryside, farmers, middle class, skilled 
workers, unskilled workers, Liberal Protestants, and Roman Catholics 
(Table 1). It would have been interesting to look even more closely at ex-
pected ‘forerunners’ such as the elite or Jews, but their numbers are too 
small. My exercise does not yield clear results. Neither people living in 
rural areas, nor farmers, show a statistically significant larger likelihood 
and speed to progress to a next child when they had four sons or four 
daughters. It is unlikely that the difference with Sandstöm & Vikström’s 
findings is caused by a much earlier onset of the fertility decline in Ger-
many than in the Netherlands. At any rate, the total fertility rates of both 
countries did not diverge strongly before the First World War (source: 
www.gapminder.org; see Ajús & Lindgren, 2008). Occasionally, I do find 
significant results, but they are not very consistent. In the period 1925-1949, 
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the middle class appears to have a preference for a mixed set of children, 
and especially for continuing with childbearing when they had only girls 
(2.6 times more likely than the reference category of a mixed set). The pat-
tern seems to have started in 1900-1924 when they also exhibited a higher 
likelihood of having more children in the case of only girls (borderline sig-
nificant). Another finding relates to the ‘Liberal Protestants’ (Dutch Re-
formed, Lutherans, Mennonites and Remonstrants, see Kok, 2017) in the 
period 1875-1899. When they had only daughters, they tended to stop more 
often. Borderline significant findings are the greater likelihood and speed 
of proceeding to the next child for couples with only boys in cities between 
1850 and 1874 (+35%), skilled workers in the same period (+40%), and 
middle-class couples in 1875-1899 (+35%). Indeed, it is interesting to see 
that in many cases the relative chances of a next child for ‘only boys’ are 
higher than for ‘only girls’. Apparently, parents wanted to have at least one 
girl more than they did at least one boy. Again, this corroborates the find-
ings of Reher et al. (2017). 
 
Table 1. Relative likelihood (Cox regression) of progression to a fifth child. 
  
†p,0.1, *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. Based on Sandström & Vikström (2015, pp. 65 and 67); 
hsn release 2010. As we do not know in most cases when the parents married, the 
outcomes are ordered by the birth date of the (fourth) child. Controls include age of 
the mother, urban/rural residence, religious denomination and socio-economic 
status. Only those parental families are included in which the Research Person had 
already been born. 
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                                                         1825-49               1850-74              1875-99           1900-1924          1925-1949 
                                                     Only    Only    Only     Only     Only     Only     Only     Only     Only     Only 
                                                     boys      girls      boys      girls      boys      girls      boys      girls      boys      girls 
Marriage cohorts of parents  
14 German villages                    0.96       1.22*      1.08       1.32*      1.27*      1.29*                                                  
Birth cohorts of children 
Dutch countryside                                                0.98       1.04       1.09      0.93       0.97       1.02       1.13       0.83 
Dutch cities                                                             1.35†      1.02       1.01       0.87       0.91        1.01        1.06       1.18 
Farmers                                                                   1.04       1.08       1.04      0.81        1.06      0.98      0.86      0.97 
Middle class                                                           0.94      0.90       1.35 †    0.86       1.00       1.37†      1.47       2.61* 
Skilled workers                                                       1.40†     1.14        1.05       0.97       0.85        1.18        1.43       0.71 
Unskilled workers                                                  1.02      0.98       1.02      0.89      0.94      0.92       1.14       0.84 
Liberal Protestants                                                 1.10       0.93       0.93       0.79**   0.93        1.06       1.41       0.82 
Roman Catholics                                                    1.01       0.95        1.08      0.92       0.87       0.96       1.02      0.89
pioneers of the pigeon pair 
 
So far, focusing on higher parities has not brought much substantive evi-
dence of sex preferences in the Netherlands before 1950. But perhaps we 
should focus on lower parities. Perhaps couples deciding to have a small 
family – a trend which started in the first half of the twentieth century – 
were actually more likely to consider the sex of their children than couples 
who already had a sizeable family. In the next experiment, I select couples 
having a second (surviving) child after 1900. Moreover, I only select 
couples in which the mother was younger than forty. In principle, these 
couples could still go on to have a third child, if they so wished.  
    In table 2, the outcomes of the event history analysis are presented. The 
first model only includes the composition of the family, and we can see 
that it does not have any effect on progression to the third child. The 
contrast with the control variables in model 2 is striking. Compared with 
rural couples, couples in cities are much more likely to delay or forego the 
arrival of a third child (-22%). Also, the socio-economic differentials are 
as expected. All social groups have a lower likelihood of a third child than 
the farmers. The smallest difference in likelihood exists with the unskilled 
workers, who probably still counted on the future (wage) incomes of their 
children. Religion clearly has an autonomous influence as well (see also 
Engelen 2009, p. 76-84). Compared to the Roman Catholics, all groups 
have lower likelihood of a third child, especially people with no religion, 
Liberal Protestants, and Jews. 
    We would expect forerunners of the two-child family consisting of a 
boy and a girl to live in cities, to be from the higher or middle class, and 
to have no or lenient religious beliefs concerning the possibility of choos-
ing one’s own family size, let alone its composition. To find those ‘pioneers 
of the pigeon pair’, we add a number of interactions to the model. In Model 
3 we interact the sex composition of the two-child family with living in a 
city. We see that the interaction points in the direction of a preference for 
a mixed family in cities, but that only the effect of having daughters is sig-
nificant. In other words, couples living in cities having two daughters were 
more likely to go on having children than urban couples with a mixed off-
spring set. Model 4 presents the same exercise with middle class couples, 
but the outcomes are not significant, and neither is the exercise of calcu-
lating an interaction with elite status (not shown here). Religion, as so 
often, turns out to be a better predictor of demographic behavior. An in-
teraction of family composition with Liberal Protestant denomination 
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shows a clear preference for a mixed family. A similar, but statistically 
weaker, result was found for non-denominationals (only boys* no re-
ligion=1.13, p=0.619; only girls * no religion=1.76, p=0.029). 
    Our exercise has taught us that, overall, sex preferences did not play a 
role in the decision to have a third child. To some extent, the lack of a ‘gen-
eral’ effect may have been caused by counteracting (or cross-over) effects, 
for instance when the rural population had different preferences from the 
urban one, or the Protestant population from the Catholic one. To account 
for such cross-over effects, we added a number of interactions to the 
model, which did indeed suggest that effects differed by subgroup. The 
clearest indication of a preference for having (at least) a boy and a girl was 
found among Liberal Protestants. Research using the same definition of 
this religious group, and contrasting it in a similar way (multivariate ana-
lyses using the Historical Sample of the Netherlands) to Roman Catholics 
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Table 2. Relative likelihood (Cox regression) of progression to a third child, 
period 1900-1950, mothers younger than forty  
                                                         Model 1      Model 2       Model 3      Model 4       Model 5 
Mixed=ref                                                                                                                                
Only boys                                           1.04              1.05              1.04              1.06              1.01 
Only girls                                            1.03              1.03              0.99              1.02             0.98 
Rural=ref. 
Urban                                                                      0.78***        0.76***        0.78***        0.79*** 
Farmer=ref.                                                                                                                             
Elite                                                                         0.68**          0.69**          0.68**          0.68** 
Middle class                                                           0.72***        0.73***        0.73***        0.72*** 
Skilled worker                                                        0.77***        0.77***        0.76***        0.76*** 
Unskilled worker                                                   0.85***        0.85***        0.85***        0.85*** 
Other/unknown                                                    0.67***        0.67***        0.67***        0.66*** 
Roman Catholic=ref. 
Liberal Protestant                                                  0.62***        0.62***        0.62***        0.59*** 
No religion                                                             0.47***        0.48***        0.47***        0.45*** 
Orthodox Protestant                                             0.76***        0.75***        0.75***        0.76*** 
Jewish                                                                      0.64**          0.63**          0.63**          0.63** 
Other religions                                                      0.71***         0.71***         0.71***         0.71*** 
Only boys*urban                                                                        1.07                                     
Only girls*urban                                                                         1.19*                                    
Only boys*middle class                                                                                 0.94                 
Only girls*middle class                                                                                   1.05                 
Only boys*Liberal Protestant                                                                                             1.17* 
Only girls*Liberal Protestant                                                                                              1.21** 
Chi-square                                         1.38          393.03***    399.18***     393.98***    404.01*** 
n                                                          6,838            6,838            6,838            6,838            6,838  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01., ***p<0.001 
has shown a (significant) higher tendency of childlessness, of having only 
one child, of more spacing and earlier stopping with childbearing (Kok 
2017, p. 73). To these indicators of birth control we can now add that of 
stopping after the second child when the two children were of different 
sexes. 
 
 
conclusion 
 
This brief exercise in historical demography has shown that sex prefer-
ences for offspring were virtually non-existent in the Netherlands before 
1950. In so far as we did find evidence, it was (statistically) weak and in-
conclusive. This should not come as a surprise. We have seen that, even 
in contemporary Europe, in one-third of the countries surveyed, sex pref-
erences are absent. Furthermore, the literature suggests that such prefer-
ences are more likely to be found in low-fertility regimes, whereas the 
period we studied was still characterized by relatively high fertility. How-
ever, Reher et al. (2017) did find indications of a Dutch preference (after 
1900) for a mixed offspring set, particularly when there was still no girl. 
This different result might have been caused by their clustering of all par-
ities, and/or by their inclusion of the death of the last child as a time-de-
pendent variable. It might be advisable to emulate their model as well. 
However, the difference with the clear findings for the nineteenth-century 
German villages is also striking. The Historical Sample includes a wide 
variety of people (differing by type of locality, by occupation, by religion) 
and perhaps a greater similarity in social conditions and cultural norms 
accounts for the unequivocal German response to a non-mixed offspring 
set. However, the villages are spread across Germany, and include different 
religions and inheritance rules (Sandström & Vikström 2015, p. 61). It is 
more likely that my sample consists of many different groups, perhaps to 
be labelled communicating communities (Szreter, 1996), with different 
norms regarding whether to control family size at all, on what would be 
the ideal size, and on what would be an ideal composition. Such norms 
would be communicated within local (or national, depending on the types 
of communication mechanism) communities. Adding all these commu-
nities together may lead to cross-over effects, resulting in limited overall 
outcomes. At the very least, my analysis of the arrival of the third child 
has shown that Liberal Protestants in contrast to Roman Catholics were 
more likely to stop having more children when they had a boy and a girl. 
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    In his work on the fertility decline, Theo Engelen has argued for models 
charting motivation and for acceptance of the idea that couples could con-
trol their own family size. He argued that understanding how, when and 
why reproductive mentality changed was crucial to unraveling the differ-
ent regional courses of the fertility transition (e.g. Engelen & Hillebrand, 
1990). I argue that mentality change may not only be visible in the desire 
to control the number of children, but also in their sexes. However, such 
a desire does not seem to be part of the Dutch fertility transition before 
1950. 
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